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516-544.
Reviewed by Sue Onslow, London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE)
Published by H-Diplo on 4 May 2007
his is a straightforward and workmanlike account of one of the worst British
military disasters of the Second World War. As Andrew Stewart’s article shows,
following the catastrophic fall of Singapore, the surrender of the Tobruk garrison
in June 1942 proved a crisis of confidence in the British imperial war effort, leading to
international questioning of Britain’s ability to fight on against the Axis powers, and
causing acute strain on the Anglo-South African relationship at a critical juncture in the
Second World War. With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to see that in contrast to
the parliamentary autopsy on the Norwegian campaign of 1940, and trenchant criticism in
the House of Commons on the debacle of intervention in Greece in April 1941, the Prime
Minister Winston Churchill managed to weather parliamentary criticism with relative
ease. In retrospect, the blow to British pride and military resolve proved remarkably
short lived and by the time of the victory at El Alamein in November 1942, the surrender
of the Tobruk garrison had mercifully faded. However, this study provides a welcome
analysis of the insidious impact of military setback on metropolitan-Dominion relations,
setting this in the context of political personality and cooperation and the broader context
of imperial/Dominion relations between London and Pretoria.
Stewart’s study begins with comment on the circumstances of the fall of the Tobruk
garrison. The rapid surrender of the fortification, under the command of a relatively
youthful South African general, supported by a division of South African troops, stunned
the British public. It seemed incomprehensible that Tobruk, which had successfully
withstood a siege by the Italian army the previous year, should surrender so swiftly to
General Rommel’s onslaught. This led to accusations of cowardice and incompetence in
Britain and South Africa, reviving questions in Britain of the reliability of the South
African’s commitment and contribution to the war effort, and of the disadvantages of the
British connection among elements of the South African Afrikaner community.
The analysis provided in this article emphasises the particular, and peculiar role of the
long-standing personal friendship and working relationship between Churchill and Jan
Smuts, dating back to the Anglo-South African war at the turn of the twentieth century.
The Anglophile Smuts was the most imperially minded of the Dominion Prime Ministers,
and had been a member of the Imperial War Cabinet during the First World War, and
thus was a politician of unique standing in the eyes of London. The author could also
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profitably have made reference to the crucial contribution made by Smuts to Eden’s
decision in Cairo in early 1941 to gamble on a campaign in Greece. The British Cabinet
had been appalled by Eden’s apparently insouciant pursuit of a Balkan front as the vital
element of this venture, and the British archives at Kew show Smuts’ advocacy in
support of this peripheral strategy had been the deciding factor.
This article would have been strengthened by re-arranging the structure of the overall
argument -spelling out more clearly at the outset the significance of Tobruk in Anglo-
South African relations and how this rift was overcome. For example, it would have
been beneficial at the outset to flag up the importance of Afrikaner opinion and the
neutrality debate within South Africa – and its implications – at the start of the article. It
investigates the available material at the National Archives, from PREM [U.K. Prime
Minister’s Office records], Dominion Office, and War Office files, providing a useful
summary of British understanding of South African thinking, drawing on sound research
into the primary and secondary material. However, additional consultation of multi-
archival sources would have strengthened the weight of analysis. There is evidence of
consultation of Churchill and Smuts’ personal papers, but what of the Eden papers at
Birmingham, the Leo Amery papers at Churchill College, Cambridge, and the Ismay
papers at King’s College, London? It must be said a research trip to the South African
National Archives in Hamilton, Pretoria, would also have been extremely fruitful to
provide primary evidence and detailed complexity to the South African angle of this
story. Further comment on Smuts’ moral authority – stemming from his personal
experience, relationship with Churchill and consequent authority – would have been
welcome. The author also misses the importance of the earlier Greece debacle in Anglo-
imperial relations: just as at Gallipoli in 1915, the Greek campaign had involved
Australian and New Zealand troops – and this too ended in disaster. In May 1941, the
British led forces had been obliged to withdraw from Crete. Given the resonance of
imperial troops’ involvement in British-led military strategy – and associated Dominion
sensitivity of autonomy and sacrifice – it would have been a bonus if, funds permitting,
the author had been able to consult Australian and New Zealand archives for first hand
evidence of opinion elsewhere in the Dominions of the South African role in the Tobruk
debacle.
This is a minor quibble, but the article contains a number of irritating errors, and raises
important questions in the mind of the reader. South West Africa was not ‘handed’ to
Pretoria in 1919. It constituted a League of Nations Class C mandate, to be administered
by South Africa. The British Nationalist government did not survive the withdrawal of
British and Commonwealth forces from Greece ‘with relative ease’. The Foreign
Secretary, Anthony Eden, was given a particularly rough ride in the House of Commons.
How difficult WAS Churchill’s decision to reverse his earlier rejection for an enquiry
into Tobruk? Why was the British Government afraid Smuts might be ‘assassinated’? –
as opposed to merely losing the confidence of his political constituency? At important
points, the clarity of the development of the argument is clouded by the author’s syntax.
However, in the main these are indeed minor points. Stewart rightly sets the iconic
importance of the fall of Tobruk firmly in terms of an aspect of imperial relations which
is all-too-often forgotten: that the Anglo-South African relationship in 1939-1942
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constituted a unique set of tensions, dating back to the turn of the century, and which had
been highlighted on the eve of the Second World War. The existing historiography
focuses on South African doubts and obduracy in the run up to conflict in 1939. This
article underlines that South Africa’s contribution to continental defence stemmed in
overwhelming part to the personality and outlook of General Jan Smuts – as London was
only too painfully aware. It also underlines that the residual strength of Boer opposition
to British imperialism and London’s conception of its vital national interests, was very
much in the minds of policy makers in London, and concerted efforts were made to limit
the potential serious rift from developing within the Imperial alliance.
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